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Eleanor Holmes Norton 
CHAIR 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL 
American Civil Liberties Union to submit written comments to your 
ad hoc committee of the Judicial Conference. Although we are 
pleased to have the opportunity to comment, we must express our 
grave concern at the process for recommending changes in so 
serious a matter as the availability of federal habeas corpus for 
the adjudication of constitutional claims raised by citizens 
sentenced to death in state court. We believe that such a 
serious matter warrants a far more comprehensive approach 
including extensive public hearings and an opportunity to comment 
on specific proposals. Because we do not know what specific 
proposals the Committee is considering we are unable to focus our 
comments on the specific issues raised by any specific proposal. 
Moveover, we have been unable to give this matter the exhaustive 
study it deserves because we only recently received notice of the 
Committee's willingness to review comments with a June 1 
deadline. Given these constraints, this letter attempts only to 
sketch our initial thoughts; we would appreciate an opportunity 
to elaborate our views later and to comment on specific proposals 
in due course. 
' 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, ret. 
June 1, 1989 
I. Initial Observations 
At the outset, we confess some concern that your letter 
states the committee's purpose as, in part, to "formulate 
proposals to reduce the delay in the implementation of capital 
sentences .... " That statement seems to assume, first, that 
executions are in fact delayed and, second, that the Judicial 
Conference has an interest in eliminating any such delay. In our 
view, neither assumption is warranted. The federal habeas courts 
require time in which to address petitioners' claims. The time 
required for the courts to carefully consider legitimate 
constitutional claims relating to the appropriateness of an 
irrevocable should not be labeled as "delay." Moreover, while 
the Judicial Conference has an entirely appropriate concern that 
litigation in the federal courts be prompt and efficient, it is 
not clear to us that the Conference has any direct interest in 
expediting state criminal sentences. Surely, the paramount 
interest of the federal courts in these cases is safeguarding the 
rights of Americans. No other interest should take precedence. 
The assumptions underlying a project of this kind necessarily 
color both the analysis and the conclusions. If those 
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An inquiry into the federal courts' adjudication of claims 
raised by death row prisoners is undertaken against a background 
-- in which- two different but related debates are raging. First, 
there is the continuing controversy over the desirability of 
federal post conviction habeas corpus. That debate has a long 
history, but it took on new significance in the early 1980s when 
the first of a series of bills, supported by the Justice 
Department, was introduced in the Congress. Similar bills have 
been put forward in every Congress since, including the present 
session. Of course, none of those bills has been enacted into 
law. Second, there is the even more divisive controversy over 
the death penalty. These two debates are commingled when 
attention turns to the availability of federal habeas corpus in 
capital cases. The results can be deeply troubling. 
In all candor, we doubt the wisdom of charging a committee 
to examine habeas corpus in death penalty cases alone. Such a 
charge invites a study of the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
on the one hand, or a study of the advisability and 
administration of capital punishment on the other, to be skewed -
when views fashioned in one debate spill over into the other. 
For example, and here we are abundantly candid only to be clearly 
understood in these serious circumstances, we are concerned that 
whether an observer regards the postponement of executions 
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pending federal habeas as "delay" may depend on that observer's 
views regarding the death penalty. 
Any proposals your committee generates may bear significant 
consequences for matters beyond the scope of your project. 
Narrowly focused prescriptions, offered with only death penalty 
cases in mind, can undercut the overarching framework for federal 
collateral litigation generally. Similarly, proposals to change 
habeas corpus law in general can have serious implications for 
the administration of capital punishment in the jurisdictions 
that impose the death penalty. Indeed, any proposal to limit 
federal collateral review in death penalty cases invites the 
creation of a discriminatory system, where death penalty 
petitioners would have fewer opportunities to have their claims 
heard in a federal forum than the ordinary state prisoner. Given 
the irrevocable nature of the penalty and the well documented 
rate of constitutional error in such cases, this would be an 
unacceptable result. 
We are further concerned that the narrow focus on habeas as 
it relates to capital cases will lead this committee to view new 
restrictions on collateral review as a possible means of 
conserving judicial resources. Capital cases by no means 
comprise the largest portion of state or federal court dockets. 
Efforts to improve judicial economy on the backs of capital 
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defendants will foster injustice and will not significantly 
advance the goal of judicial efficiency. 
Finally, any proposal to limit access to federal review in 
death penalty cases must be viewed against a backdrop of 
pervasive racial discrimination. Nowhere is the presence of 
discrimination more starkly presented than in the imposition of 
the death penalty. As Justice Brennan points out in his 
dissenting opinion in Mccleskey v. Kemp. 481 us 279 (1987) there 
are a "myriad of opportunities for racial considerations to 
influence criminal proceedings." See,~, Batson v. Kentucky. 
476 U.S. 79 {1986) (in the exercise of preemptory challenges); 
Vasguez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 {1986) (in the selection of the 
petit jury); Amadeo v. Zant 56 108 s.ct 1771 {1988) (intentional 
under-representation of jurors based on race and sex); Whitus v. 
Georgia 385 U.S. 545 {1967); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 
(1967) (in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Donnelly v. 
De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (in conduct of arguments); 
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 {1986) {in the conscious or 
unconscious bias of jurors). Moreover, over a decade of research 
reveals a remarkably consistent pattern of sentencing which 
appears to be explained only by race. See e.g •• s. Gross & R. 
Mauro, Death and Discrimination {1989); Bienen, Weiner, Allison & 
Mills, "The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The 
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Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 36 (1988); 
Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, "Arbitrariness and Discrimination in 
the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State 
Supreme Courts," 15 stetson L. Rev~ 133 (1986); Radelet & Pierce, 
"Race and Prosecutorial Discretion in Homicide Cases," 19 Law and 
Soc. Rev. 587 (1985). The Court in Mccleskey rejected the 
petioner's request for relief based on evidence of a statistical 
disparity in capital sentencing and placed an exceedingly high 
burden on capital defendants seeking to obtain relief from race 
discrimination. It did not, however, abdicate its obligation to 
ensure that invidious discrimination does not influence decisions 
of life and death. This Committee must understand that any 
further limitations on access to federal collateral review that 
it may propose will undoubtedly serve to further insulate 
racially biased state proceedings from review. Moreover, without 
the vigorous federal oversight that habeas provides, we see 
little likelihood that states which suffer from institutionalized 
racial bias throughout the criminal justice system will feel 
compelled to squarely address the problem. 
II. The Time Required for Adjudication in Habeas 
The time necessary for adjudication in habeas corpus is, of 
course, an issue in discussions regarding habeas generally. Some 
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critics charge that the mere availability of habeas corpus 
extends litigation unnecessarily and threatens the finality of 
state court judgments. That argument is circular; it begins with 
the proposition that post conviction habeas lacks justification 
and on that basis laments the time devoted to collateral 
adjudication. If, by contrast, one accepts the value of federal 
adjudication of federal claims, the expenditure of time and 
resources is entirely appropriate. We take the latter view. 
Pressures to expedite habeas adjudication for no better reason 
than to advance the day when criminal sentences are deemed to be 
beyond legal challenge should be resisted. In this, we include 
procedures, approved in Barefoot v. Estelle 463 US 800 (1983), to 
expedite death penalty litigation in particular. 
Of course, we recognize that some litigants need incentives 
to keep cases moving. In habeas corpus, however, such incentives 
are abundant. Prisoners with claims that might set them free 
have ample reason to press those claims aggressively. Moreover, 
petitioners who sit on their rights may suffer dismissal under 
Rule 9(a). 
If there is any explanation for singling death penalty cases 
out for special attention, it must be that these ordinary 
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incentives for prompt litigation are thought to be ineffective 
when petitioners face death rather than future custody. That is 
not so. Rule 9(a) applies to all habeas cases, capital or not, 
and petitioners who have constitutional claims that might lift 
the threat of death from them can be expected to pursue those 
claims zealously. The notion that capital petitioners are 
content to languish on death row, to engage in dilatory tactics, 
and generally to abuse avenues for frivolous litigation in order 
to postpone the inevitable is not supported by any reliable data 
of which we are aware. In fact, the State can and does move 
cases along at will by setting execution dates. No other 
litigants can precipitate action by their opponents. If, indeed, 
death-sentenced prisoners occasionally can be found with no 
litigation pending, it is undoubtedly because they lack the 
resources needed to press their claims in court. This lack of 
resources largely stems from these condemned prisoners' inability 
to obtain counsel or legal materials. At the state post-
conviction level, only 19 states mandate the appointment of 
counsel in capital cases; 15 states allow the discretionary 
appointment; and in two states, Georgia and New Hampshire, there 
is no right to counsel. Further, states such as Florida prohibit 
death row inmates from physical access to the prison law library. 
Instead, the state requires condemned inmates to request at most 
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three specific legal materials, from their cells, once a week. 
Mello, "Facing Death Alone: the Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis 
on Death Row," 37 Am. U.L. Rev. 513, 543 (1988). 
Nor is it the case that death row prisoners are moved to act 
only by the spur of imminent execution. The explanation for 
feverish litigation on the eve of executions is that it is then, 
and often only then, that the prisoners concerned obtain counsel 
to speak for them. Legal talent for prisoners sentenced to death 
is spread thin in the United States. Specialists typically 
channel their efforts through a sort of triage, which gives 
highest priority to clients in immediate danger. 
In this connection, the committee would do well to recommend 
that stays of execution be automatic during postconviction 
litigation, in either state or federal court, just as they are 
pending direct review. We recognize that collateral litigation 
does appear to proceed on a hurry-up-and-wait schedule. Cases 
move along deliberately, and then suddenly the lawyers and judges 
are caught up in the exigencies of emergency practice--with the 
attendant logistical difficulties, general inconvenience, and 
emotional drain. The contrast is not, however, between 
deliberate foot-dragging on the one hand and equally deliberate 
eleventh hour litigation on the other. It is between the normal 
pace of complex litigation and emergency practice imposed upon 
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the parties by the (sometimes unanticipated) establishment of 
execution dates. Capital cases would proceed on a balanced basis 
if attorneys were not required periodically to abandon the 
development of their arguments in order to prevent the execution 
of their clients before viable claims are adjudicated. 
Finally, let this be clear. Death penalty cases may be 
expected to proceed more slowly than noncapital cases. The 
stakes being what they are, surely the courts are warranted in 
taking whatever time is required for careful, deliberative 
adjudication. Moreover, the complexities of eighth amendment 
doctrine generate litigation that takes time to complete. Often, 
lawyers must investigate factual matters never before explored; 
always, they must research, develop, and advance sophisticated 
legal contentions. If this society wants the constitutional 
rights of capital petitioners to be respected, and it clearly 
does, then it follows that the federal courts charged with 
enforcing those rights must be allowed an appropriate opportunity 
to do their job. Surely, if the federal system is able to 
tolerate the pace of other complex federal litigation, it should 
tolerate the pace of death penalty litigation where life rather 
than money is at stake. 
10 
, 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, ret. 
June 1, 1989 
III. The Conceptual Framework of Habeas Corpus 
The federal courts' jurisdiction to entertain petitions for 
the writ of habeas corpus constitutes the principal federal means 
by which the Bill of Rights is enforced, via the fourteenth 
amendment, against state power. The Supreme Court is physically 
incapable of sitting as a court of error to determine federal 
claims on direct review from the state courts; collateral 
litigation in the lower federal courts provides the essential 
alternative. The availability of such a mechanism for searching, 
sensitive, and independent adjudication of constitutional claims 
on the merits is vital to the preservation of the system of 
individual rights enjoyed by all. 
Congress has never given the lower federal courts authority 
to take appeals from the state courts, and the federal courts 
thus do not regard their role as reviewing state judgments for 
error. By contrast, § 2241 of the Judicial Code, providing for 
the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, establishes an 
independent head of federal judicial power, comparable to the 
general federal question statute, § 1331. 
Of course, petitioners for the federal writ of habeas corpus 
often have previously engaged in litigation in state court. This 
is because Bill of Rights claims typically arise as procedural 
defenses on the part of defendants in state criminal 
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prosecutions. While criminal defendants could be permitted to 
turn such defenses into affirmative claims for immediate relief 
in federal court, the current scheme contemplates that defendants 
will remain in state court, raise their federal claims in the 
manner provided by state law, and then, if they wish, press the 
same claims in federal habeas corpus--which necessarily is 
exempted from the full faith and credit statute and ordinary 
preclusion rules. This system has the advantage of avoiding 
federal interference with state court proceedings in criminal 
cases. It also involves the state courts in the making and 
enforcement of federal constitutional law. 
Some observers have begun to argue that federal habeas 
corpus should be considered a further stage of the criminal 
proceedings initiated in state court and that the federal courts 
should function as appellate tribunals--in the teeth of Congress' 
unquestioned decision not to establish an appellate jurisdiction 
directly. In its strong form, this perspective challenges the 
very existence of the federal habeas jurisdiction. In its mild 
form, the appellate review model suggests that habeas "review" 
should be sharply circumscribed in the manner of direct appeals 
within a single jurisdiction. 
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We submit that the appellate framework for federal habeas 
corpus is inappropriate. We take the two forms of the argument 
in turn. 
A. Proposals to Limit the Issues That Can Be 
Addressed in Habeas 
Once federal habeas corpus is conceived as appellate in 
nature, in the minds of some it becomes largely unnecessary. 
Given that all the states provide for direct review in the state 
appellate courts, an additional appeal to the federal courts 
seems to the federal writ's harsh critics to be redundant, 
wasteful, and disrespectful. By this account, the federal habeas 
courts should eschew serious treatment of the merits of claims 
already addressed in state court and, at most, should merely 
ensure that state court judgments on federal questions are 
"reasonable.'' This is the understanding of habeas offered in a 
series of bills introduced in the Congress in recent years. The 
ACLU has opposed those bills--in company with the American Bar 
Association and other groups concerned that habeas corpus be 
retained and the Congress has consistently failed to enact them. 
Issue preclusion has no place in federal habeas corpus. It is 
that simple. 
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As we have demonstrated in our testimony in the Congress, 
illustrative copies of which are attached, any proposal that the 
federal courts should be asked to determine not whether the state 
courts got a federal question wrong, but whether they got it 
unreasonably wrong, is plainly misguided and unworkable. More 
fundamentally, the notion that federal habeas corpus should be 
relegated to checking state court judgments for extraordinary 
error misconceives the nature of the habeas jurisdiction and 
disregards the fundamental decision, made years ago by the 
Congress and long respected by the Supreme Court, that habeas is 
an occasion for plenary adjudication of constitutional claims. 
There can be no question that here as in other cases, the 
federal courts must remain the final arbiter of federal rights. 
Certainly, your committee would make a serious mistake if it 
were to endorse a cut-back in the scope of federal habeas review 
in death penalty cases. First, where human life is at stake the 
federal courts' ability to reach and determine the merits of 
federal claims should be at the maximum. Second, the vagaries of 
substantive eighth amendment doctrine make it essential that the 
federal courts be free to make independent and authoritative 
judgments of their own. In this vein, the committee should take 
careful note that the rate of successful federal habeas petitions 
is extraordinarily high in death penalty cases: 60-70% as of 
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1982; 70% as of 1983; 60% as of 1986; 73.2% between 1973-1983. 
See Mello, supra, at 521. See also, Brief of Amicus curiae 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., app. E, at 6e, 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). To deny the federal 
courts the ability to reach federal claims in capital cases would 
be to risk, even to acknowledge, that petitioners with 
meritorious claims will go to their death. 
B. Proposals to Establish Rigid Procedural Barriers to Habeas 
Other proposals, some of which have also appeared recently 
in failed bills in the Congress, would have the federal habeas 
courts operate in the manner of appellate courts within a single 
jurisdiction. Four contentions dominate this account: (l)habeas 
proceedings should begin shortly after the last state court 
judgment in a case; (2)direct review of state court judgments in 
the Supreme Court should be eliminated; (3)the federal habeas 
courts should defer to factual findings in state court; and 
(4)the federal courts should enforce state rules on when and how 
issues must be raised on pain of forfeiture. 
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1. A Statute of Limitations for Habeas Corpus 
Any proposal to link the initiation of federal habeas corpus 
with previous state court proceedings by demanding that federal 
petitions be filed within a fixed time after judgment in state 
court seriously mistakes the nature of the habeas jurisdiction. 
Once again, the federal habeas courts do no review state court 
decisions directly, second-guessing state judges and purporting 
to overturn judgments thought to be erroneous. By contrast, 
habeas corpus petitions initiate new and independent lawsuits in 
which the federal courts have the power and obligation to 
appraise federal claims afresh. To neglect this well-settled 
conceptual understanding of habeas is to tamper with the 
distribution of judicial business recognized and respected for 
generations. Moreover, as we explained earlier, capital habeas 
applicants do not sit on their rights after the completion of 
state court proceedings. 
If litigants need any additional incentives to press their 
claims in season, those incentives are provided by Rule 9(a), 
which establishes a workable and working scheme for appraising 
allegedly tardy claims, measuring any 9enuine state interests 
jeopardized by delay, and dismissing claims when late filing is 
unjustified and prejudicial. Nothing more is needed. A firm 
statutory period promises only an arbitrary barrier to the 
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federal forum, which would primarily affect prose petitioners 
who are either unaware of the time limit or unable to to meet it 
-- or both. Such petitioners would be denied a federal forum 
even if no state interests have been jeopardized. 
Proposals to establish a statute of limitations for federal 
habeas corpus have been offered over the years. Those who find 
the federal forum undesirable naturally enough seek to cut off 
claims on procedural grounds, whatever the merit of those claims. 
And a stringent statute of limitations would constitute just such 
a procedural vehicle for defeating the habeas jurisdiction. 
Impoverished prisoners, often attempting to negotiate complex 
proceedings prose would routinely miss any such deadline, beause 
of ignorance or inability to move with the speed required. 
Particularly in death penalty cases, a statute of 
limitations that forecloses treatment of claims notwithstanding 
their merit would work an egregious hardship. These are the 
cases in wich procedural barriers, intended merely to encourage 
effciency in litigation, should be relaxed in favor of 
adjudication on the merits -- lest a mechanistic insistence on 
procedural form send petitioners with solid claims to their 
death. 
It may be tempting to respond to complaints about habeas 
corpus with a statute of limitations that allows petitioners what 
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seems to be a reasonable time in which to act, yet creates an 
incentive to proceed promptly. Such a statute would not 
constitute the benign policy it seems on first glance to be. 
Prisoners need time to identify and articulate their claims, 
marshall their arguments, and present their cases to the federal 
courts. Given their imprisonment, their poverty, and their 
general lack of resources, they need much more time than ordinary 
litigants. Accordingly, rigid statute that displaces Rule 9{a) 
would operate to deny federal adjudication to prisoners who need 
it most. 
2. Supreme Court Review of State Judgments 
The misguided idea that federal habeas corpus may be 
understood as a species of appellate review begets a similarly 
ill-advised suggestion: that direct review of state court 
judgments in the United States Supreme Court might be scrapped--
if not immediately after direct review in the state appellate 
courts, then in the wake of state postconviction proceedings. It 
is common currency, of course, that the Supreme Court's 
certiorari jurisdiction is properly limited to cases presenting 
issues of special national moment. We would not expect, then, 
that the Court would accept review at the behest of many would-be 
federal habeas applicants, capital or otherwise. Certainly no 
18 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, ret. 
June 1, 1989 
litigant should be obligated to ask the Court for discretionary 
review on the chance that the Justices might find her or his case 
certworthy. Yet the elimination of such an opportunity to seek 
direct review prior to federal habeas corpus would deny 
petitioners, and the Court itself, an important vehicle for 
constitutional litigation. 
This is particularly true in death penalty cases. Many of 
the Court's eighth amendment decisions in recent years have come 
on direct review of state court judgments. Direct review could 
become even more important under recent cases. See Teague v. 
Lane 108 s.ct 1106 (1988). While in many instances the Court 
finds federal habeas adjudication to perform a valuable screening 
function, working issues into shape for Supreme Court 
consideration, the fact remains that the Court often chooses to 
take issues sooner. When it does, everyone's interest in prompt 
adjudication is served. 
Certainly there is no warrant for foreclosing direct review 
merely on the ground that time is required for petitions to be 
considered. Certiorari applications must be filed promptly, and 
the Court deals with them on a tight schedule. There is no solid 
evidence whatever of any "delay" associated with certiorari 
practice. 
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It is also true that in light of Stone v. Powell, direct 
review in the Supreme Court constitutes the principal opportunity 
for federal treatment of fourth amendment exclusionary rule 
claims. To cut off Supreme Court review in favor of immediate 
resort to federal habeas corpus would be to frustrate entirely 
the adjudication of exclusionary rule claims in a federal forum. 
3. Federal Court Treatment of State Fact-Finding 
To be sure, appellate courts typically defer to state court 
findings of primary fact and reject such findings only if they 
are found to be clearly erroneous. At least since Brown v. 
Allen, however, independent fact-finding in habeas corpus as been 
accepted as equally routine. Subject to §2254(d), which accords 
state findings a presumption of accuracy in certain specified 
circumstances, the federal courts have the authority, and in the 
situations identified in Townsend v. Sain the obligation, to hold 
evidentiary hearings and make their own findings touching federal 
rights. 
This fundamental element of habeas law is as sound as it is 
well-settled. Constitutional claims of the kind that are raised 
in habeas corpus are fact-sensitive. Particularly in death 
penalty cases where an inadequate record at the state level is 
often the result of uninformed or incompetent representation at 
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the trial, the federal courts must have the authority to find the 
facts. Indeed, if the federal habeas courts are to fulfill their 
function as authoritative tribunals, they must attend to the 
critical fact-finding stage of adjudication just as to the 
posterior, judgment phase. 
Arguments that state court findings should routinely be 
accepted in federal court again mistake the nature of federal 
habeas corpus. Indeed, by neglecting the vital role of fact-
finding in constitutional adjudication, such arguments threaten 
to frustrate the fair treatment of claims when they are properly 
before the federal courts for decision. 
4. The Effect of Procedural Default in State Court 
After the Supreme Court reintroduced the adequate and 
independent state ground rule in habeas corpus, it might have 
been expected that some habeas critics would carry the point on 
to an extreme conclusion: claim preclusion. The Court itself has 
done no such thing; nor has the Congress. To be sure, the 
federal habeas courts may decline to consider claims that might 
have been, but were not, raised seasonably in state court--if the 
state courts, for that reason, refused to hear the claims later. 
But the current "cause-and-prejudice", "miscarriage-of-justice" 
formulation remains reasonably flexible. 
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The committee would make yet another mistake if it were to 
encourage the notion that death penalty habeas corpus can or 
should be expedited by the invocation of the forfeiture rules now 
in place or the more rigid rules that some observers would 
prefer. First, the routine preclusion of federal claims would 
run counter to the underlying proposition in habeas corpus that 
the federal courts are open to consider such claims 
independently. It would hardly make sense formally to put habeas 
forward as an opportunity for federal enforcement of federal 
rights, but at the same time to frustrate any treatment of the 
merits by the imposition of harsh forfeiture sanctions. 
Second, it is demonstrably plain that habeas petitioners in 
capital cases have ample incentives to comply with state 
procedures for raising federal claims in state court and scarcely 
need the threat of preclusion in federal habeas as an additional 
reason to meet state procedural requirements. Sandbagging is a 
myth. Litigants and attorneys in state court do not commit 
procedural default strategically, in order to "save" federal 
claims for the federal forum. The genuine explanation for 
defaults by unrepresented litigants is ignorance; the explanation 
for defaults by counsel is ignorance again--as well as neglect 
and, all too often, rank incompetence. Condemned inmates lack 
the ability to serve as their own lawyers: their education levels 
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and intelligence are very low and many prisoners are mentally 
retarded and/or suffer from mental illness. See Mello, supra, at 
548-52. Moreover, many attorneys who have handled these cases 
are ill-equipped to try a case in this complex area of law. Some 
counsel have failed to provide effective assistance by conceding 
the defendant's guilt, failing to investigate or present any 
evidence in mitigation, or committing a per se violation of due 
process by putting a mentally incompetent defendant on the stand. 
Id. at 521. It is frankly unfair to cut off federal adjudication 
of the merits of claims because a petitioner's attorney in state 
court, in most instances a lawyer assigned to the case by the 
trial court, made a significant procedural error. Forfeiture 
rules do not effectively encourage compliance with state law, but 
only provide an easy, we think cynical, excuse for foreclosing 
what may be meritorious claims. 
Third, many claims raised in federal court by capital 
petitioners flow from the intricacies of eighth amendment 
doctrine. Issues of that kind are rarely foremost in the minds 
of defendants and counsel in state court, where the immediate 
objective is to avoid conviction or a death sentence in the first 
instance. If the chief question before the committee is the way 
in which the federal courts should deal with eighth amendment 
claims, then it makes very little sense to refer to procedural 
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default doctrine for an answer. In this vein, it is vital to 
recognize that the current system depends upon a small group of 
death penalty specialists to advance and develop sophisticated 
eighth amendment contentions. These attorneys typically become 
involved in cases only at the federal habeas stage. Then to 
block their arguments because of what other, ill-informed lawyers 
did or failed to do in state court would threaten the judicial 
system's ability seriously to enforce eighth amendment standards. 
Forfeiture rules, the committee must understand, foreclose 
adjudication in any forum, state or federal. 
Fourth, it is unseemly at best to waste the considerable 
talents of federal judges on litigation over the applicability of 
procedural default/forfeiture rules. It is one thing to engage 
the lower federal courts in the enforcement of Bill of Rights 
claims on the merits. One could scarcely think of a better use 
of federal judicial resources. It is quite another to immerse 
busy district judges in time-consuming litigation over whether 
they should reach the merits. Anyone who has read the reports of 
habeas cases in recent years knows full well that the federal 
habeas courts spend an enormous amount of time deciding whether 
to decide--before getting down to deciding. We submit that it 
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would be far better to use the federal courts for the essential 
work they were given jurisdiction to do--the enforcement of 
federal rights on the merits. 
Fifth, in this same direction, veteran observers of federal 
habeas corpus .consistently point out that the most effective 
means of achieving efficiency in federal collateral proceedings 
would be to discard vexing, time-consuming litigation over 
threshold procedural matters and allow the federal courts to go 
immediately to the merits of petitioners' claims. Here, as in so 
many other instances in life, the best long-run course is the 
course that respects the legitimate interests of all concerned. 
If the committee really wants to strike a blow for common sense 
regarding federal habeas corpus, it should recommend that the 
system stop wasting precious resources on excuses for avoiding 
the merits and spend those same resources on straightforward 
adjudication of substantive claims. 
IV. The Role of Counsel 
Experienced, competent counsel plays a critical role in the 
fair administration of justice. Most of us would not dream of 
going before a traffic tribunal without our legal training or 
unrepresented and yet we expect capital defendants to go before 
tribunals to beg for their lives without lawyers who are expert 
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in their craft. Everyone who has studied these problems 
acknowledges that death-sentenced petitioners need vigorous 
professional representation. Moreover, many or most apparent 
inefficiencies in habeas corpus practice can be traced to the 
absence or inadequacy of counsel, either before or after 
petitioners apply for federal relief. See, Brief of the 
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 9-60, Murray v Giarrantano. 847 F.2d. 1118 (4th 
Cir. 1988), Petition for cert filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3549 (Feb. 
21,1989) (no. 88-411); ~ also Mello, supra, at 519-30. If the 
committee does nothing else, it should offer bold and 
thoroughgoing proposals for seeing to this vital requirement. 
Specifically, the committee should endorse efforts to provide 
counsel to indigent capital defendants be provided with counsel, 
beginning with the initiation of the criminal prosecution in the 
first instance and continuing until no viable avenues remain open 
in any forum. 
Of course, defendants in capital cases are constitutionally 
entitled to counsel through the trial stages and on first appeal 
as of right. Thereafter, under current case law, constitutional 
entitlements are less clear. The question whether indigent 
capital petitioners are constitutionally entitled to government-
provided counsel in state postconviction proceedings is now 
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before the Court in Murray v. Giarrantano. We think the Court 
should recognize such a right. The prospect of petitioners 
attempting to identify, develop, and argue federal claims prose 
is unacceptable. Petitioners need counsel to press their claims; 
state authorities and courts also benefit from the participation 
of professionals. 
Congress has recently established a statutory right to 
counsel for death-sentenced petitioners in state court as well as 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings under the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988. This is an important first step. Vigorous support 
of such a scheme is necessary to assure that resources are made 
available to provide experienced counsel is in these cases. 
To begin, it makes only good sense that counsel should be 
provided to prepare certiorari petitions to the United States 
Supreme Court. The Court is now besieged with prose petitions 
that only exacerbate overwhelming logistical pressures on the 
Justices. Certainly in death penalty cases, if not in all, the 
Court needs and should have the benefit of papers prepared and 
filed by professionals. 
Counsel is again essential in any later appellate review in 
the Supreme Court. When, indeed, capital cases make their 
ultimate approach to the Court, professional advocates are 
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critical if claims are to be given their due in circumstances in 
which failure means execution for the litigant. 
Simply put, experienced, competent counsel should be 
provided routinely. In addition to this basic proposition, the 
committee should accept several others. 
First, it is essential that counsel be provided at the 
preparation stage and throughout subsequent proceedings, and not 
merely if and when a prose petitioner first states a 
nonfrivolous claim. Far too often under current arrangements, 
petitioners are caught in a litigational catch 22. They must 
identify and advance factual allegations and apparently 
meritorious legal contentions before they can hope for 
professional representation, which, of course, is almost always 
essential to the development of allegations and claims in the 
first instance. This is unacceptable in any class of cases and 
wholly intolerable in capital litigation. 
Second, it is equally critical that the lawyers provided to 
capital litigants are of the highest professional caliber. It is 
not enough merely to announce formally that death-sentenced 
petitioners should be given counsel of some sort. As recent 
studies have shown, the formal promise of Gideon v. Wainwright 
has been breached time and again. That cannot be permitted to 
occur in this instance. Great care must be exercised to see that 
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the lawyers recruited to represent capital petitioners are 
experienced, skilled, and zealous advocates--willing and able to 
pursue their clients' cause competently and effectively. They 
should meet rigorous standards well above those fixed for 
assigned counsel in noncapital cases. They should be fairly 
compensated commensurate with the services they render, and they 
should be allowed ample funds to cover the costs of investigation 
and evidence preparation. These standards are in fact 
established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
Third, in order to ensure the quality of legal counsel in 
death penalty cases in state court, the lawyers concerned should 
not be selected in the ordinary fashion by the trial court. 
Rather, independent machinery should be established at the state 
level. 
Fourth, government-funded attorneys chosen for capital cases 
should have the benefit of resource centers, also government-
funded, which provide expert guidance and assistance. Death 
penalty litigation is enormously complex, and it is vital that 
even seasoned professionals be supported by specialists. 
Fifth, while continuity in legal representation has value on 
the whole, individual lawyers should not be asked to serve the 
same client over what may be years of litigation. Death penalty 
litigation is notoriously difficult and draining; the potential 
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for exhaustion is great. The involvement of different lawyers 
along the way is often essential to the maintenance of committed 
advocacy. Moreover, new counsel is better positioned to evaluate 
what has gone before, to appraise possible avenues that may have 
been overlooked and, of course, to examine the effectiveness of 
the representation that the client received previously. Put 
simply, the efficiencies associated with continuous legal 
representation should not be preferred over the fresh insights of 
new counsel. 
Sixth, in federal habeas corpus proceedings, lawyers who 
have performed competently in state post-conviction proceedings 
should be appointed as counsel. The federal capital resources 
centers should be relied upon to assist the court in matching 
these skilled lawyers with the appropriate clients. Accordingly, 
federal judges can and must have plenary authority to see that 
death-sentenced petitioners are well represented. 
Finally, we all must realize that the availability of 
counsel, even excellent counsel, will not address all the 
problems and issues in this vexing field. Certainly, it would be 
wrong to think that collateral litigation in habeas should be met 
with a simplistic, two-prong attack--the provision of counsel at 
all stages coupled with a rigid system of forfeitures that holds 
petitioners to the mistakes lawyers make. The availability of 
30 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, ret. 
June 1, 1989 
first-rate lawyers to capital litigants is a step, but only a 
step, in the direction of ensuring that the courts, state and 
federal, are positioned to address federal constitutional claims 
on the merits, deliberately and efficiently. The establishment 
of such a regime should be the committee's objective. 
We hope these remarks are useful to you and the committee. 
Of course, we are available to respond to any questions you may 
have. As noted at the outset we would appreciate an opportunity 
to elaborate on the thoughts presented here. We also believe 
that it is essential to provide an opportunity to the ACLU and 
others to provide the Committee with detailed comments on any 
proposals that the Committee is seriously considering. We, 
therefore, ask that you release a draft of your report and allow 
time for careful comment before the Committee makes any final 
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Dear Justice Powell: 
Thank you for inviting the Legal D~fense Fund to submit our 
views on the subject of capital collateral review. 
As you and the committee members are well aware, for the 
past 25 years the Legal Defense Fund has provided legal 
representation to scores of indigent death-sentenced inmates 
throughout the United States. We have appeared as counsel of 
record and amicus curiae in cases before the United States 
Supreme Court and in state and federal post-conviction 
proceedings. We have lent assistance to attorneys, many of them 
having no prior experience in criminal, habeas or capital cases, 
who have volunteered to represent an indigent, capitally-
sentenced defendant on a pro bone basis. Our experience during 
the past three decades has given us insight into the workings of 
the state criminal justice systems, as well as the federal habeas 
corpus process. 
We understand the goal of your committee to be to formulate 
proposals that will lead to more orderJy review of capital cases. 
Change within the capital trial, direct appeal, and collateral 
review process is indeed desperately needed. Our experience 
~, 
teaches that these changes must take place primarily in the state 
system; lengthy federal review, where it occurs, and the problems 
associated with that review, are largely born, bred, and 
cultivated, in the state system. 
A responsible examination of the role of federal review of 
state capital cases begins with the realization that the state 
court process critically shapes capital cases before these cases 
ever arrive at the federal courthouse door. We have found three 
factors most substantially · influence the length and scope of 
federal review of capital cases: (1) the absence of competent, 
adequately compensated defense services throughout the state 
process; ( 2) the lack of meaningful post-conviction review in 
the state system; and (3) the reluctance of state judges to grant 
relief and thereby appear to the electorate as "soft on crime." 
Over and over again, one or more of these factors operates to 
preclude all but the most superficial review of meritorious 
federal constitutional claims in the state courts.1 
Simply stated, our experience has taught us that unwarranted 
1 We have already provided the Committee with data 
explaining the incidence of harmful federal constitutional error 
in capital cases during the post-Furman era. See, April 3, 1989 
letter from Associate Counsel George H. Kendall to Professor Al 
Pearson. Our data show that the federal courts of appeal have 
granted relief in roughly 40% of the cases considered on habeas 
review. This number, in and of itself, shows that any cutback in 
the scope or vigor of federal review will only ensure the 
execution of inmates who were sentenced to death in violation of 
the Constitution. 
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delay2 emerges from the unwillingness of many states to perform 
as responsible partners in federalism. It is the state's 
obligation to provide adequate defense services in all capital 
cases. 3 Many do not. It is also the state's duty to wash their 
*own linen, rather than pretending that it's not dirty and then 
react[ ] with a fit of pique when the federal courts hold to the 
contrary.w Evans v. State, 441 So.2d 520, 532 (Miss. 
1983) (Robertson, J., dissenting) . 4 state courts continue to 
ignore straightforwar~ violations of the constitution and fail to 
provide any viable post-conviction process. We briefly flesh out 
these views below. 
1. The inadequate funding for indigent defense. 
Capital cases are complex. They are necessarily time 
intensive and consume more resources than any other criminal 
matter. Even experienced defense attorneys usually find 
defending a capitally-charged client an overwhelmingly draining 
and difficult experience. Mastery of Eighth Amendment 
2 We take it as a given that capital cases are complex 
matters, that they almost always present serious constitutional 
issues, that counsel, both for the petitioner and state, require 
a substantial amount of time to adequately prepare their views, 
and courts often require considerable time for thought and study 
prior to rendering judgment. No one can or should expect these 
cases to pass through our already crowded court systems at 
breakneck speed. Complex cases, as with any complex matter in 
life, take more time. 
3 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
4 Justice Robertson's dissent in Evans articulates best the 
responsibilities o~ the state courts, in our system of 
federalism, when they are called upon to review constitutional 
error in capital cases. We commend its full reading to committee 
members. 
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jurisprudence and state capital procedure, a complete 
investigation of a client's life, and planning for the bifurcated 
proceeding, impose considerable burdens in addition to the 
pressures attendant to any high profile homicide case. No one 
disagrees that the practice has become a specialty, and one that 
few lawyers develop willingly.5 
Despite the obvious need for only experienced, adequately 
financed counsel to represent capitally-charged defendants, many 
states make no provision for such representation. The great 
majority of persons charged with capital crimes are indigent and 
therefore depend exclusively upon court-appointed counsel. In a 
substantial number of states with death statutes, there is no 
state funding for indigent defense. 6 The responsibility for 
indigent defense is left to each county. Alabama typically 
limits appointed counsel's fee for handling a capital trial to 
$1000.7 Arkansas has a similar provision. 8 And many trial 
courts in Georgia, Mississippi and other states provide similar 
5 In most states, the prosecution has long recognized 
capital cases require specialists. In District Attorney's 
offices throughout the country, only prosecutors with substantial 
felony trial and capital trial experience handle capital cases. 
Every state Attorney General's off ice that we know of long ago 
created a special division to handle capital appeals. These 
assistant attorneys general do little else but represent the 
state in capital cases on direct appeal, and through state and 
federal post-conviction proceedings. 
6 Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas, for example, 
-provide little or no money on a state-wide basis for indigent 
defense, even in capital cases. 
7 See Code of Alabama §15-12-2l(d). 
8 See Arkansas Code Ann. §16-92-108. 
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levels of compensation. 9 As a result, little incentive, 
financial or otherwise, exists for attorneys to develop expertise 
in defending criminal cases generally, and capital cases in 
particular. 
It is not surprising then that many capitally-charged 
defendants are represented by inexperienced counse1, 10 or counsel 
without resources to adequately investigate and prepare the case. 
It is little wonder that these attorneys fail to perform 
investigations that could turn up witnesses for the penalty phase 
or adequately investigate the state's case at each phase of 
tria1.ll It is also not surprising that such underfunded counsel 
are unaware of fundamental constitutional requirements peculiar 
to capital cases. Justice Robertson, having reviewed numerous 
capital cases as a member of the Mississippi Supreme Court, · has 
found these problems arise there regularly. 
We have reviewed the record in numerous death 
penalty cases in recent years. Generally, we 
9 Recently, a United States district court in Georgia 
reversed the convictions and death sentence imposed by the state 
court on Nathan Brown. Brown and his two co-defendants were 
indigent. The state trial court appointed the same lawyer to 
represent all three defendants and told the lawyer he would be 
paid $500 per case. In Mr. Brown's case, this attorney filed no 
pretrial motions. The district court granted habeas relief 
finding trial counsel's conflict of interest violated the Sixth 
Amendment, whereas the state courts had repeatedly denied relief. 
Brown v. Zant, No. CV-188-027 (S.D.Ga. 1989). 
10 See ~, Tyler v. Kemp. 
1985) (lead trial counsel admitted 
appointment). 
755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 
to bar six months before 
11 See~, Agan v. Dugger, 828 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1987); 
Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430 (11th Cir. 1987); Thomas v. 
Kemp. 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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find that a vigorous all-out defense is made, 
although there are exceptions. Generally 
speaking, the Mississippi Bar has reason to 
be proud of the vigor and competence with 
which its members have defended capital 
cases. On points that arise regularly in 
criminal cases of all descriptions - change 
of venue, insanity defense, pretrial motions 
to suppress statements and evidence, trial 
tactics generally, jury instructions, and the 
like - our bar has performed well. What 
happens frequently, however, and what has 
happened in this case, is that - as a 
conventional criminal case - the case was 
well tried. In spite of this. numerous 
important and highly technical death penalty 
issues were not raised. Most of the sixteen 
issues presented on this petition are issues 
which have resulted in death sentences being 
vacated in other cases. These are points of 
law with which the average Mississippi 
criminal defense lawyer has no familiarity. 
Evans v. State, 441 So.2d at 528 (Robertson, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
This absence of competent, adequately compensated defense 
services also inhibits competent advocacy on direct appeal. In 
some states, the money received for trial is assumed to cover the 
attorney's time for preparing and arguing the appeal. 
Repeatedly, we have seen direct appeal briefs that comprise but 
10 or 20 pages, cite little law, and argue but a few issues. 12 
12 See e.g .• Morgan v. Zant, 743 F.2d 775, 780 {11th Cir. 
1984) ( "It is uncontradicted in the record that Morgan's trial 
counsel did not file a notice of appeal and filed a brief only 
after the Georgia Supreme Court threatened to impose sanctions. 
This brief, which included only five pages of argument, failed to 
raise as an issue the trial court's charge to the sentencing 
jury. Counsel failed to attend oral argument before the Georgia 
Supreme Court and failed to heed a request by the court that he 
file a supplemental brief on the adequacy of the trial court's 
penalty charge. We find this conduct on the part of Mr. Morgan's 
attorney woefully inadequate and likely ineffective.") 
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The consequences of inadequate funding for defense service 
at trial and direct appeal are substantial. Important evidence 
necessary to sustain a defense in the culpability phase, or to 
portray a mitigating circumstance at sentencing, is never 
uncovered and utilized. Counsel fail to perceive and assert even 
obvious constitutional error. For the defendant and the system, 
the proceedings lack completeness and reliability. They fall 
short of being the "main event," the time when all important 
legal issues are- properly raised and reliably resolved. Their 
incompleteness necessitates comprehensive post-conviction review. 
After direct appeal, despite the importance of preparing a 
thoughtful petition for writ of certiorari, 13 many court-
appointed attorneys consider their obligation to the client at an 
end.14 It is at this point that many indigent death-sentenced 
inmates must rely upon pro bone counsel to step forward and 
assume responsibility for the case.15 Few states provide any 
13 Teague v. Lane, 109 s.ct. __ , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
14 This is because the appointment by the trial court or 
state supreme court rarely envisions the filing of a petition for 
writ of certiorari. 
15 In the past, civil rights organizations in states with 
sizable death row populations have provided the link between the 
legal community and death row. It is not unusual for such 
volunteers to contact 30-40 law firms prior to finding a firm 
willing to take on the representation of a capital petitioner. 
As every member of this committee knows well, that commitment can 
consume hundreds of hours of professional time and thousands of 
dollars of out-of-pocket expenses. 
The recent creation of Resource Centers in 13 states has 
not solved this problem. For instance, in Georgia, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, and Alabama, Resource Center staff provide direct 
representation to only a small number of the inmates in their 
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compensation to counsel after the direct appeal, even in capital 
cases. Representation on certiorari before the United States 
supreme Court, the filing and prosecution of state and federal 
constitutional claims in the state post-conviction court, any 
appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, and seeking 
certiorari from that order, must be provided, if at all, by 
volunteer counsel. 
Because the quality of representation at trial and on direct 
-appeal is all too often far from adequate, habeas counsel must 
start from scratch. Habeas counsel simply cannot rely upon the 
work of his predecessor. Counsel must thoroughly investigate the 
case to see if evidence supporting a defense at trial, or a case 
for life, was available and not pursued. The record must be read 
with great care to see if meritorious constitutional error, both 
state and federal, was identified and raised properly. Counsel 
must raise every possible issue at this stage to (1) bring to the 
attention of the habeas court any constitutional violation, and 
(2) exhaust the issue for later federal habeas review. 
These lawyers, serving entirely in a pro bono capacity, 
often fail to assert claims solely because they lack the 
state. Direct representation, for most inmates, will continue to 
be provided by the private bar. None of these states provide 
any money for attorney fees or expenses. Volunteer counsel is 
expected still to absorb all such costs and expenses incurred in 
state collateral proceedings. And our survey of a number of 
states, including Texas, Alabama and Mississippi, has informed us 
that volunteer attorneys are becoming harder, not easier, to 
find. All the southern states continue to have indigent, death-
sentenced inmates with no counsel. Our efforts to locate new 
volunteer counsel have also grown more difficult. 
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resources to adequately investigate the case or because they 
simply cannot devote the hundreds of hours of unpaid time 
necessary to thoroughly review the entire record. And where the 
state has set an execution date, matters are worse. Papers are 
drawn and court proceedings held often prior to counsel having 
read all or even most of the record. State post-conviction 
review becomes even less available when working under a warrant, 
and the time crunch only exacerbates the effect of the lack of 
resources. Under these circumstances, the state collater~l 
process operates to discourage and devalue, rather than entertair. 
and resolve, serious constitutional challenges to the fundamental 
fairness of the conviction and capital sentence. 16 
2. Strict default rules and the absence of meaningful 
review in state post-conviction proceedings. 
While the absence of adequate defense resources at trial and 
direct appeal acts to severely constrain the assertion of 
constitutional claims, and the near complete absence of such 
resources in state post-conviction proceedings makes their 
assertion there even more difficult, the increasingly strict 
enforcement of procedural default rules in the state court system 
all but precludes entertainment of meritorious constitutional 
claims. Today, such enforcement far exceeds the legitimate 
16 Again in sharp contrast to the volunteer counsel 
representing the indigent, death-sentenced petitioner, the state 
is usually represented by members of the Attorney Genera) 's 
office. These offices, in addition to providing counsel, also 
have resources to retain expert assistance and to cover all other 
expenses incurred in post-conviction proceedings. 
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interest of the state in preventing a capital defendant, or his 
attorney, from withholding a viable claim from the state forum; 
today, even meritorious claims going to the heart of the fairness 
of the case will not be entertained in more and more state 
systems, even where their untimely assertion is based wholly upon 
inadvertence or negligent error of counsel. 
In many states, the post-conviction process precludes 
relitigation of issues decided on direct appeal . 17 New claims 
asserted in such- proceedings are also barred; the failure to 
bring them at trial and direct appeal constitutes a default that 
will be excused only by showing that previous counsel provided 
ineffective assistance of counsel or that the state prevented the 
assertion of the claim. This unwillingness to entertain new 
claims in post-conviction proceedings, a dramatic change from a 
decade ago, renders the state post-conviction remedy in many 
states wholly impotent to address even shocking violations of the 
Constitution.18 
17 Even when a petitioner can show that an intervening 
decision casts serious doubt upon the correctness of the direct 
appeal decision, many state habeas courts will refuse to 
reentertain the claim. 
18 A good case in point is Georgia. Until 1983, claims not 
raised at trial or direct appeal could be entertained on their 
merits in post-conviction proceedings. See, O.C.G.A. 9-14-42; 9-
14-48. In a large number of capital cases, new counsel identified 
and raised issues unforeseen by prior counsel. This scheme 
ensured that the state court system had the opportunity to take 
corrective action where harmful constitutional error was 
-identified. For all cases tried after January 1, 1983, a strict 
rule of default is applied. No longer does the F,tate judge 
review the fairness of the proceeding. Instead, the court 
typically refuses to entertain any issue decided on direct 
appeal, and will not reach the merits of any claim presented for 
10 
Looking at the Mississippi collateral review process, 
Justice Robertson aptly describes its inability to remedy error: 
Evans v. 
After today, we have no plain, adequate and 
speedy post-conviction remedy for 
adjudication of constitutional issues. 
Today's decision makes clear that, if such 
issues are presented at trial and on direct 
appeal, they are barred on error coram nobis 
as res judicata. If such issues are not 
presented at trial and on direct appeal, they 
are deemed waived. All ' constitutional claims 
are thus precluded from post-conviction 
review. Today's decision unmistakably holds 
that tq_e writ of error coram nobis is no 
longer a viable form of post-conviction 
action for the litigation of a prisoner's 
constitutional claims no matter how 
meritorious those claims may be. The writ has 
become an ambassador without portfolio. 
State_, 441 So.2d at 524 (Robertson, 
dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
J. ' 
Our experience has taught us further that State prosecutors 
urge state courts to rigidly enforce default rules, not to 
promote some higher interest of justice, but to preclude later 
federal review, even when it is clear the constitutional claim 
was not timely asserted because the defense lawyer simply goofed. 
Again, Justice Robertson: 
It is important to understand the reasons why 
the State urges that the issues tendered be 
disposed of on procedural grounds only. The 
State's articulated motivation is to short-
circuit anticipated federal review . 
the first time unless the petitioner can show cause and 
prejudice. In many instances, the only claim reviewed on its 
merits is one of ineffective assistance of trial and direct 
appeal counsel. In short, the corrective rer:tedy available prior 
to 1983 has been replaced with a scheme that induces the court to 
ignore and leave for the federal courts to correct even the most 
egregious constitutional violations. 
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The state is saying we should hold Evans' 
claims procedurally barred, not because such 
would promote the interests of justice, but 
rather that such would pull the rug out from 
under Evans when he ultimately seeks federal 
review of his case. 
441 So.2d at 531. Particularly where claims are not brought 
timely because of lawyer error, the state's subordinating federal 
constitutional rights to rules of procedure constitutes a triumph 
of form over justice. Without a state forum to entertain serious 
constitutional claims, the capital petitioner has no choice not 
to seek federal review. 
Coupled with the lack of adequate defense resources, strict 
enforcement of default rules precludes corrective action except 
in the most extraordinary case. And the preclusion of merits 
review in the state system in most instances insulates even 
serious constitutional violations from review in federal court. 19 
3. The politically sensitive state judiciary. 
Capital case often subject judges to intense political 
scrutiny, more so than any other type of legal proceeding. 20 In 
19 See Dugger v. Adams, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989); Smith v. 
Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). 
20 In 1985, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit overturned the convictions and death 
sentences of three inmates who had been convicted of killing 6 
members of a farming family in a rural Georgia county. See, 
Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985). According to 
the court officials, this decision generated more hostile mail 
and phone calls than any desegregation order rendered in the 
1950-G0's. In its aftermath, over 200,000 persons signed 
petitions seeking the impeachment of each judge. These petitions 
were presented to the House Judiciary Committee. 
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states where members of the state judiciary stand for reelection, 
or for reconfirmation by the voters, a judge's voting record in 
capital cases can decide the election. 21 From 1983 - 1987, the 
Georgia state judge who hears many of the state post-conviction 
petitions filed by capital defendants issued 26 decisions. He 
has yet to grant any relief in any capital case. Because state 
judges rarely enjoy the insulation from the passions of the day 
life tenure reposes with Article III judges, political pressure 
can and does influence a judge's willingness to grant habeas 
relief in these highly visibl~, controversial cases. 22 
21 In 1986, three judges on the California Supreme Court, 
all with voting records in capital appeals which were 
characterized as favoring capital defendants over the rights of 
law abiding citizens, were targeted and portrayed as being soft 
on crime by special interest groups who supported, inter alia, 
the death penalty. Each judge was soundly defeated in · the 
November confirmation election. 
22 The reluctance of the state judiciary to remedy serious 
federal constitutional error can be seen by comparing the 
treatment given cases in the state post-conviction process with 
their later review in the federal system. For example, between 
1983 and 1988, 49 opinions in capital habeas cases issued ·from 
the state post-conviction process in Georgia. The state courts 
granted habeas relief in only two cases. See Curry v. Zant, 371 
S.E.2d 647 (Ga. 1988) (ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
guilt and penalty relief ordered); Zant v. Hamilton, 307 S.E.2d 
667 (Ga. 1983) (court modifies granting of full relief on 
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds to provide only penalty 
relief). In 14 cases where the state courts had denied relief, 
the federal courts found harmful constitutional error and ordered 
habeas relief. Each case presented straightforward violations of 
the Constitution. See Brown v. Zant, No. 88-CV-228 (N.D.Ga. 
1988) (full relief ordered after court finds Brady violation and 
unreliable determination of petitioner's competency to be tried); 
N. Brown v. Zant, No. CV-188-027 (S.D.Ga. 1989) (three independent 
constitutional errors found in capital sentencing proceeding to 
warrant penalty relief; conflict of interest of trial counsel 
warrants guilt relief); Cervi v. Kemp, 855 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 
1988) (full relief ordered after court found straightforward 
violation of Edwards v. Arizona); Dick v. Kemp, 833 F.2d 1448 
13 
In addition, a considerable number of state court judges 
plainly do not keep up with federal law and have no regular 
access to federal reporters. We have appeared in a number of 
(11th cir. 1987) (full relief ordered because burden-shifting 
charge not harmless); Godfrey v. Kemp, 836 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 
1988) (full relief ordered by district court affirmed; court found 
burden-shifting charge not harmless and double jeopardy clause 
violated by second death sentence); Hardy v. Kemp, No. C86-115 
(N.D.Ga. 1987) (penalty relief ordered because prosecutor's 
closing argument violated fundamental fairness); Jones v. Zant, 
No. 88-CV 328 (N.D.Ga. 1989) (penalty relief granted because jury 
utilized Bible during sentencing deliberations and because of 
overbroad construction of aggravating circumstances) ; Mathis v. 
Zant, No. 87-2355 (N.D.Ga. 1989) (failure of trial counsel to 
present any mitigating evidence at penalty phase constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel; penalty relief ordered) ; ~ 
Moore v. Zant, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane) (penalty 
relief ordered because of unconstitutional penalty instruction; 
case remanded for further factfinding on Giglio issue) ; W. A. 
Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1988) (full relief 
granted; evidentiary hearing in district court showed that 
petitioner's mental retardation foreclosed knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his rights to silence and counsel) 
rehearing en bane granted; W. K. Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 647 
(1988) (failure of trial counsel to present psychiatric evidence 
showing petitioner suffers from substantial mental disease 
ineffective assistance of counsel; penalty relief ordered); 
Strickland v. Kemp, 738 F. 2d 1542 .(11th Cir. 1984) ( full relief 
ordered as record shows petitioner was incompetent to stand 
trial); Thomas v. Kemp. 796 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir. 1986) (failure of 
trial counsel to present any evidence in mitigation despite 
evidence showing petitioner was good worker yet suffered from 
schizophrenia ineffective assistance of counsel; penalty relief 
ordered); Wallace v. Kemp, 757 F.2d 1102 (11th Cir. 1985) (full 
relief granted as r~cord shows petitioner was incompetent to 
stand trial). In 4 cases, federal review has been delayed due to 
exhaustion issues. See Collier v. Kemp, No. 86-282 
(N.D.Ga) (remanded for exhaustion of state remedies); Gilreath v. 
Zant, No. 87-50 (N.D.Ga.) (remanded for exhaustion of remedies); 
Putman v. Kemp, No. 84-79-VAL (M.D.Ga.) (petition dismissed 
without prejudice for exhaustion); Stevens v. Zant, 580 F.Supp. 
322 (S.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissal for exhaustion); No. CV-286-84 
(S.D.Ga.1988) (dismissal for second time for exhaustion). Eleven 
of these cases are pending in the federal system; three cases did 
not receive any relief in the original federal habeas proceeding; 
three cases received relief and/or are pending within the federal 
system in successor proceedings, and 12 cases have been denied 
relief in successor federal habeas proceedings. 
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courts over the years where the state judge informed counsel he 
would prefer counsel rely upon cases decided by his state supreme 
court because he had no other reporter available, and if we did 
rely upon federal case law, we should submit xerox copies of the 
opinions. such courts are ill equipped to deal with the complex 
federal constitutional claims often presented in these cases. 
The review given such claims in state court is plainly inferior 
to later review in the federal forum. As long as state courts 
insulate themselves from the development of federal 
constitutional law, those courts have no legitimate claim to the 
last word on questions of federal constitutional law. 23 
Finally, we have dealt with state court judges who are 
openly hostile to vigorous representation in capital cases. 
During the past 4 years, several judges from all parts of Georgia 
have refused to appoint, in cases returning for retrial from the 
federal courts, the counsel who represented the death-sentenced 
inmate for years in post-conviction proceedings and who won 
relief. These counsel are uniquely and fully qualified to 
represent the indigent client on retrial. In several instances, 
inexperienced counsel, or counsel the client justifiably was wary 
23 The Supreme Court has also observed this phenomenon. In 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513 ( 1979) , trial counsel 
attempted to tender to the state trial court federal decisions in 
support of his argument that the burden-shifting charge about to 
be directed to the jury violated due process. That judge 
rebuffed that effort: "'You can give those to the Supreme Court. 
The objection is overruled.'" 
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to trust, was appointed over objection. 24 
our experiences lead to the conclusion that the states, in 
these key areas, have failed to act as a responsible partner in 
our system of federalism. 
Because of the serious problems concerning indigent defense 
and the shrinking opportunity to secure correction of 
constitutional error in the state courts, any plan to make more 
orderly the collateral review process must realistically address 
the following: 
1. The states must be willing to provide 
competent, independent, and adequately 
compensated counsel, and other defense 
services at trial, on direct appeal, for 
certiorari, and for state post-conviction 
proceedings. Where it does, it will be the 
exceptional case, rather · than the rule as 
today, that issues of fact and law are not 
timely raised and litigated before the state 
courts. 
2. The states should apply their procedural 
default rules, where they exist, to bar 
review only where defense counsel or the 
client was clearly aware of the relevant 
facts and/or law which supported the claim 
not timely brought. Inadvertent mistakes 
should not foreclose review. Some states 
rarely apply their default rules to bar 
constitutional claims raised by capitally 
sentenced inmates, either on direct appeal or 
in post-conviction review. Constitutional 
error accordingly is treated on its merits, 
and reviewing courts can focus on whether the 
24 We are participating in a law suit challenging the 
refusal of one trial judge to appoint qualified counsel at 
retrial. Gamble v. McMillan, No. CV-688-0066 (S.D. Ga. 1989). 
There, in lieu of simply appointing counsel who had successfully 
vindicated a Batson claim on appeal, the trial court first 
sulicited bids from area attorneys, and then, without 
explanation, contacted a defense lawyer from outside the circuit 
and appointed that lawyer. 
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trial was fair; not whether the state's rules 
were honored to perfection. 
3. The states should provide a meaningful 
post-conviction process that allows for 
litigation of claims inadvertently omitted on 
direct appeal, and for claims, such as 
ineffective assistance, which could not be 
asserted sooner. The petitioner should be 
encouraged to raise all constitutional claims 
in this proceeding. 
4. The states should refrain from setting an 
execution date until after state and federal 
post-conviction review has run its course. 
Counsel for the petitioner and state can 
agree, -as is the practice in some states, 
that cases will not languish after one court 
has completed its review. In some states, 
cases move at a regular clip because counsel 
agree, for instance, that the state post-
conviction petition will be filed within 120 
days after denial of certiorari. A similar 
agreement assures the federal habeas petition 
is filed without undue delay. The threat of 
setting a date will ensure that the petition 
for the next court is filed. 
5. After federal habeas review is completed, 
counsel for the state and petitioner should 
discuss whether changes in law or the 
discovery of new facts provide a basis for 
relief. If the petitioner plans to file 
successor proceedings in the state system, 
the courts should promptly consider the 
claims. Default rules should allow for 
merits review of claims where the petitioner 
can show significant development in the law 
or facts has taken place since the filing of 
the original habeas proceeding. These 
successor proceedings should receive prompt 
yet careful review by the state courts. 
Federal Habeas Reform 
If state capital cases arrived at the federal courthouse 
after the federal Constitutional issues had received 
comprehensive treatment on their merit~ in the state courts, few 
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would present the recurring problems we have witnessed in the 
past. With thorough and careful review by competent counsel, in 
most cases, all federal constitutional claims would arrive having 
been properly raised and exhausted. 2 5 Because of their timely 
assertion, either at trial or before the state post-conviction 
court, procedural default questions would arise infrequently. 
Because the state courts would have provided, in reality, a full 
and fair hearing on all claims, the need for a federal 
evidentiary hearing would be infrequent. The federal court, not 
delayed by the morass of issues dealing with ( 1) whether the 
claims were adequately presented before the state court; (2) 
whether they were timely presented; (3) whether the state default 
rule represents an adequate and independent ground; (4) whether 
the states apply the rule consistently; ( 5) whether the states 
allow an exception for capital cases; (6) whether the petitioner 
nevertheless substantially complied with the state rule; (7) 
whether the petitioner can show cause and prejudice for the 
default; or (8) whether the petitioner can show a miscarriage of 
justice, could instead focus primarily upon whether the trial was 
held in accordance with the constitution. The length of review 
would be shorter, and the questions the court must resolve 
dramatically fewer. 
While much of the needed change must take place in the state 
systems and is beyond the control of this Committee, steps can be 
25 As a result we suspect some of the cases that today wind 
up in federal court would receive relief in the state system. 
Accordingly, fewer cases would require federal review. 
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taken to ensure the process becomes more orderly without 
sacrificing the Committee's stated goal "to ensure fairness and 
the preservation of constitutional rights." 
Knowing that under current conditions many cases coming out 
of the state system have lacked adequate defense resources at 
every stage, we recommend that a district court presented with a 
habeas petition by an indigent defendant should take a number of 
steps to ensure that federal review is conducted more 
thoughtfully. 
1. Pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988, the district court should appoint and 
fully compensate two counsel of record. 
Where counsel has previously represented the 
petitioner in state court, and the petitioner 
[raises no objection to these attorneys,] the 
district court should appoint those counsel. 
2. Where the petitioner requires new 
counsel, the court should contact the 
Resource Center for that state, or one within 
the Circuit, for names of counsel who are 
eligible and presently able to accept 
responsibility for a death case. The court 
should rely heavily upon the Resource 
Center's recommendation. The staff , having 
monitored the case through the state system, 
will be aware of any special problems or 
needs raised by the case. The staff is in 
the best position to match the appropriate 
lawyer(s) with the proper case. 
3. The district court should also appoint 
expert resource counsel. In many cases, this 
assistance can be provided by the Resource 
Center within the state, or a Center within 
the circuit , or in cases of conflict, with 
experienced private counsel who have been 
certified by the Resource Center as competent 
and available. As with counsel of record, 
where the client and counsel have worked with 
an expert counsel in state court, unless 
there is objection from counsel of record or 
from the client, that expert should be 
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appointed for the federal proceeding. The 
court should also provide funds for expert 
assistance upon any reasonable request. 
4. With the appointment of counsel and 
expert counsel, the court should then direct 
the state to file its answer. Depending upon 
the contents of the answer, the petitioner 
will have a reasonable time to file a 
traverse. Where the state files a motion for 
dismissal claiming the petition contains 
unexhausted claim(s), the petitioner will, 
within a reasonable amount of time, oppose 
the dismissal, or move for voluntary 
dismissal of the petition and return to the 
state court for exhaustion. 
5. Where the petition contains unexhausted 
claims, and the petitioner elects to return 
to state court, the federal court should 
dismiss the petition without prejudice. 
6. When the case returns to the district 
court, counsel should be reappointed and 
should file any motion for discovery, for an 
evidentiary hearing, and for funds for expert 
services within a reasonable time. Where the 
court concludes that discovery, or an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary, they shall 
be ordered. The court should asks for briefs 
on all issues not affected by the evidentiary 
hearing, prior to the hearing, so that it can 
commence work on those issues. The court 
should receive post-hearing briefs within a 
reasonable time after the hearing and proceed 
to decide the case. 
7. Where relief is denied, the court should 
presumptively grant probable cause to appeal. 
The case should be heard as are other 
appeals, with counsel receiving the normal 
amount of time to research, write and file 
briefs. Oral argument should always be held. 
Counsel should be fully compensated for all 
work performed in the court of appeals. 
8. Where relief is denied in the court of 
appeals, the mandate should be stayed to 
permit the preparation of a petition for writ 
of certiorari. 
9. After the original habeas proceedings 
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CONCLUSION 
come to a close, counsel is obligated to 
determine whether retroactive changes in the 
law, or newly discovered changes in the 
facts, warrant further litigation. Where 
such issues are pleaded, every reviewing 
court should give the petition prompt and 
thoughtful review. 
Because capital cases are complex and involve gravely 
important issues, no reasonable voice can demand they proceed 
through our court system at breakneck speed, and any serious 
effort to impose order and reduce unwarranted delay needs to 
focus upon where the problems arise. Based on our extensive 
experience litigating habeas cases, we have concluded that 
neither the federal habeas process, nor federal judges, are the 
problem. Rather, it is the states' failure to provide competent, 
independent and adequately compensated counsel, and their 
reluctance to clean their own dirty linen, that makes these cases 
more complex and vastly more difficult for the federal courts to 
resolve promptly and responsibly. 
We urge this committee to provide the voice of reason in the 
continuing heated debate over the future scope of the writ of 
habeas corpus. That 40% of the state capital cases have given 
rise to harmful federal constitutional error, and have required 




evidence enough that if any changes are warranted, the writ ought 
to be made more available, not less so. 
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Very truly yours, 
Julius L. Chambers 
Richard H. Burr, III 
George H. Kendall 
Marjorie M. Smith 
99 Hudson Street 
16th Fl,,or 
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Dear Mr. Burchill and Mr. Pearson: 
Proposals to the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review in 
Ca~ital Cases 
Thank you for the opportunity to submit proposals concerning 
federal habeas corpus review of death penalty cases. I apologize 
that this submission will not meet the deadline of June 1, 1989. 
However, this office did not receive notice of the Committee's 
request for submissions until June 9, 1989. 
As noted by many observers, including the distinguished Chairman 
of this Committee, the present system of federal habeas corpus 
review of capital cases does not work. Chaos and unnecessary 
delay permeate the process, undermining public confidence in the 
entire criminal justice system. (See, e.g., Stephens v. Kemp 
(1983) 464 U.S. 1027 , 1032 (Powell, J., dissenting from a grant 
of stay of execution.) Proposals that seek to maintain the 
status quo simply will not do. Rather, we must seek a return to 
the essential purpose of habeas corpus--to provide a prompt, 
extraordinary remedy for an unjust detention. We :mnst also seek 
a return to the proper role of the writ in our federal system. 
The proposals that follow seek to accomplish these goals. I hope 
that the Committee will find them helpful in performing its task. 
I. The Scope of Federal Habeas Corpus--A Proposal for Change 
In major part the problems of federal habeas corpus review 
in capital cases are symptoms of a larger affliction. The 
.., 
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vast expansion of the scope of the writ to permit federal 
courts (with limited exceptions) to readjudicate federal 
constitutional issues already determined by the state courts 
(see Brown v. Allen (1953) 344 U.S. 443; Fay v. Noia (1963) 
372 U.S. 391), has denigrated the concept of finality. 
Concomitantly it has subordinated various other significant 
societal values, including the deterrence of crime, judicial 
efficiency, "the minimization of friction between our 
federal and state systems of justice, and ... the 
maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the 
doctrine of federalism is founded." (Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante (1973) 421 U.S. 218, 257-258 (Powell, J., 
concurring).) 
These concerns have motivated important proposals to limit 
the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. (See, 
e.g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 u. Chi. L. R. 142 (1970) 
(proposing that, subject to certain exceptions, the scope of 
federal habeas jurisdiction be limited to those cases in 
which petitioner supplements his constitutional claims with 
a colorable showing of factual innocence); Bator, Finality 
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. R. 441 (1963) (arguing that federal 
habeas jurisdiction should generally be limited to cases in 
which state courts fail to provide a fair process for 
litigating the federal constitutional claim).) The general 
thrust of such proposals has been to "accomodat[e] the 
historic respect for the finality of the judgment of a 
committing court with the recent Court expansions of the 
role of the writ," by seeking to reaffirm "the central 
reason for habeas corpus: the affording of means, through an 
extraordinary writ, of redressing an unjust incarceration. 
(Schneckloth v. Bustamante (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 257 (Powell, 
J., concurring); emph. in orig.) 
Sensitive to the costs incurred by the criminal justice 
system and society in general by widespread use of the writ, 
recent decisions of the High Court have sought, through 
various procedural rules, to restore the balance between 
state and federal courts, and to restrict federal habeas 
corpus interference in state criminal proceedings. (See 
Teague v. Lane (1989) 489 U.S._ [103 L.Ed.2d 334, 357] 
(plurality) (limiting creation of new rules in non-capital 
habeas corpus to those that place certain kinds of private 
conduct beyond the criminal law making power, or that 
seriously diminish the accuracy of conviction); Kuhlman v. 
Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436 (plurality) (proposing 
requirement of a colorable showing of factual innocence for 
successive petitions); Wainwright v. Sykes (1976) 433 U.S. 
72 (precluding federal court from considering procedurally 
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defaulted claims absent a showing by petitioner of cause and 
prejudice); Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465 (excluding 
from federal habeas review all Fourth Amendment claims as to 
which the state has provided a full and fair opportunity for 
litigation); Rose v. Lundy (1982) 455 U.S. 509 (requiring 
district court to dismiss petitions containing both 
exhausted and unexhausted claims); id. at pp. 520-521 
(plurality) (suggesting that abandonment of unexhausted 
claims in a mixed petition to avoid dismissal would preclude 
later consideration of the claims under the doctrine of 
abuse of the writ).) 
The High Court has also affirmed that death penalty cases 
are not immune from the concerns that have motivated this 
trend toward restricting the reach of federal habeas. 
"Collateral challenges to the sentence in a capital case, 
like collateral challenges to the sentence in a noncapital 
case, delay the enforcement of the judgment at issue and 
decrease the possibility that 'there will at some point be 
the certainty that comes with an end to litigation.'" 
(Teague v. Lane, supra, 103 L.Ed.2d at p. 358, fn. 3, 
quoting Sanders v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 1, 25 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see Smith v. Murray (1986) 477 
U.S. 527 (rejecting argument that the cause and prejudice 
standard for procedural defaults applies differently in 
death penalty cases); see also Dugger v. Adams (1989) 489 
U.S._ [103 L.Ed.2d 435] (applying cause and prejudice 
standard to death penalty case).) Indeed, for most purposes 
the Court has equated capital and non-capital habeas corpus. 
(See Smith v. Murray, supra, at pp. 537-538; cf. Murray v. 
Carrier (1986) 477 U.S. 478, 495-486.) Thus, "death penalty 
cases are no exception" to the general rule that following 
direct appeal the judgment is presumptively valid, and that 
"[t]he role of federal habeas proceedings, while important 
in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is 
secondary and limited." (Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) 463 
U.S. 880, 887.) 
In non-capital cases, the results of these attempts to 
restore balance to the scope of federal habeas have proved 
mixed at best. In capital cases, they have proved flatly 
ineffectual. (See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Capital Punishment 1987, at p. 9 (1987), showing 
that from 1977 to 1987, the average time from date of 
sentencing to execution in capital cases was 77 months).) 
The very existence of this Committee, and of the American 
Bar Association Task Force studying the same subject area, 
is testament to that fact. 
The time has come to rethink the piecemeal approach the 
Court has taken to habeas corpus reform in favor of a more 
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thorough, rational approach. With that premise in mind, and 
recognizing that the vexations of capital-case habeas 
proceedings are simply part of the larger problem of the 
scope of federal habeas corpus in general, this Committee 
should give serious thought to proposing limits on the reach 
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. As noted in Teague 
v. Lane, supra, at p. 357, the Court's recent cases "have 
moved in the direction of reaffirming the relevance of the 
likely accuracy of convictions in determining the available 
scope of habeas review." This trend provides the touchstone 
for the proposal this Committee should adopt. Where the 
state has provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate a 
constitutional claim relating to the determination of guilt, 
the federal court should be precluded from granting habeas 
corpus relief unless the petitioner makes a colorable 
showing of factual innocence. (See Kuhlman v. Wilson, 
supra, 477 U.S. at p. 454, & fn. 17; Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, supra, at pp. 265-266 (Powell, J., concurring); 
Friendly, supra, at p. 160.) 
A similar standard should apply to claims of error relating 
to the sentencing determination of a death penalty case. 
Thus, where the state has provided a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim, the 
federal court should be precluded from granting relief 
unless the petitioner makes a colorable showing that the 
alleged error undermined the accuracy of the sentencing 
determination, that is, undermined the accuracy of the 
determination that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
factors warranted death. 
These limitations on the scope of federal habeas corpus 
"would reduce the role of the federal courts in determining 
the merits of constitutional claims with no relation to a 
petitioner's innocence and contribute to the restoration of 
recently neglected values to their proper place in our 
criminal justice system." (Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 
supra, at p. 266 (Powell, J., concurring).) They would also 
cure the chaos and delay that currently afflict federal 
habeas corpus review of death penalty cases, while remaining 
true to the essential purpose of habeas corpus--to provide a 
prompt, extraordinary remedy for an unjust detention. (Id. 
at pp. 257-258.) Without such reform, there is little hope 
that the pervasive problems of federal habeas review of 
capital cases can be resolved. 
While I hope that this proposal will be adopted, nonetheless 
I recognize that there are other areas of concern that need 
to be addressed if it is not. A discussion of them follows 
hereinafter. 
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II. Exhaustion of State Remedies and Avoidance of 
Piecemeal Litigation 
The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies should be 
retained in capital cases. It is based on comity, and on "a 
pragmatic recognition that 'federal claims that have been 
fully exhausted in state courts will more often be 
accompanied by a complete factual record to aid the federal 
courts in their review.'" (Castille v. Peoples (1989) 
489 U.S._ (109 s.ct. 1056, 1059], quoting Rose v. Lundy, 
supra, 455 U.S. at 519.) Given the ever-recurring review of 
state death judgments by federal habeas courts, these 
interests are magnified in capital cases. So too is the 
concomitant "'strong presumption in favor of requiring the 
prisoner to pursue his available state remedies.'" (Castille 
v. Peoples, supra, quoting Granberry v. Greer (1987) 481 
U.S. 129, 131.) The total exhaustion rule of Rose v. Lundy, 
supra, at p. 522, which serves these and other goals, should 
also be maintained, as should the rule of Granberry v. 
Greer, supra, at pp. 134-135, which permits the courts of 
appeals to exercise discretion in determining whether to 
require exhaustion or to address the merits where the state 
has not raised the exhaustion issue. 
It has been observed that the total exhaustion rule may, in 
some instances, encourage piecemeal litigation. (See Lucas, 
Speech Before the Conference of Chief Justices (Jan. 24, 
1989), reported in Los Angeles Daily Journal, Feb. 6, 1989.) 
Prisoners whose execution dates are rapidly approaching may 
file a petition that omits available, unexhausted claims, 
for fear that a mixed petition will be dismissed under Rose 
v. Lundy, supra. But if federal district courts order 
first-time habeas petitioners to follow the procedure 
outlined in Neuschafer v. Whitley (9th Cir. 1989) 860 F.2d 
1470, 1482 (Alarcon, J., cone.)), this problem can be cured 
in virtually all cases The Neuschafer procedure is 
designed to eliminate the need and justification for the 
filing second or successive petitions, except in 
extraordinary circumstances. As described by Judge Alarcon: 
"[T]he district court can avoid the filing of 
a subsequent petition by issuing an order 
requiring the prisoner's counsel, within a 
reasonable time, to review the trial record 
and to inform the court whether there are any 
other exhausted or unexhausted claims .... 
[!] Once counsel has disclosed to the court 
all exhausted claims, the court may require 
the petitioner either to amend the pending 
petition to include such claims or to abandon 
them on the record. Similarly, once counsel 
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has disclosed all unexhausted claims, the 
court may require the petitioner to exhaust 
them in the state system or to abandon them 
on the record. The court need not hold a 
hearing on the pending petition until all 
disclosed claims have been either exhausted 
or abandoned on the record. (1) If this 
procedure is followed, the filing of a second 
petition alleging a new federal 
constitutional claim will be inexcusable, and 
an abuse of the writ, unless petitioner is 
able to allege a change in the law, a newly 
discovered fact, or ineffective assistance of 
counsel in connection with the first 
petition. " (Ibid.; emph. in orig.) 
Recently, in Rogers v. Whitley (D.Nev. 1988) 701 F.Supp. 
757, the district court followed this procedure. (See also 
Ybarra v. Sumner (D.Nev. 1988) 678 F.Supp. 1480, 1484.) 
It should be mandatory for all district courts to do so in 
capital cases. 
III. Procedural Default 
As held by the High Court in Smith v. Murray, supra, 477 
U.S. 527 and Dugger v. Adams, supra, 103 L.Ed.2d 435, the 
cause and prejudice standard of procedural default 
established by Wainwright v . Sykes (1976) 433 U.S. 72 and 
its progeny applies to capital cases. Of course, this 
standard is subject to the "safety valve" (Harris v. Reed 
(1989) 489 U.S._ (103 L.Ed.2d 308, 323 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)) of remedying a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice. (See Murray v. Carrier, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 
496-497 (miscarriage of justice exists "in an extraordinary 
case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted 
in the conviction of one who is actually innocent").) 
A specific definition of a miscarriage of justice for 
alleged errors at the penalty phase of a capital case should 
be adopted. The following is a fair synthesis of the 
Court's relevant precedents: to show a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice for an alleged error at the penalty 
phase, the petitioner must show a substantial probability 
that the alleged error actually resulted in an inaccurate 
sentencing determination, that is, in an inaccurate 
determination that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 
factors warranted death. This standard is consistent with 
Dugger v. Adams, Smith v. Murray, Murray v. Carrier, and 
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Harris v. Reed, all 
of which recognize that a claim of a miscarriage of justice 
must be "substantial;" that it must relate to an error that 
\. 
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"actually" undermined the accuracy of guilt or sentencing 
determination; and that it must be limited to the 
"extraordinary case." 
IV. The Competence, Provision, and Zeal of Counsel 
v. 
The standard of the competence of trial counsel in capital 
cases should be that established in Strickland v. Washington 
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, which itself was a capital case. No 
special standard is warranted. The Sixth Amendment does not 
have a different meaning in capital cases than it does in 
non-capital cases. 
For post-conviction review, the states should be encouraged 
to provide counsel, but should not be required to do so. In 
the appointment of counsel at the state level, preference 
should be given to those attorneys willing to follow the 
case into state and federal collateral proceedings. Such 
continuity of counsel can help alleviate the delay often 
occasioned when there are different attorneys handling the 
case at different procedural stages. However, the decision 
of what system of appointment, if any, to adopt, and what 
compensation to provide, ought to be left to the states, 
which are in the best position to appraise local conditions. 
There is no right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. 
However, if the federal court appoints counsel, it should be 
done early, with preference given to the attorney who 
handled the state proceedings. If petitioner has counsel 
for the initial federal habeas petition, the court should be 
very skeptical of second or successive petitions and last-
minute stay requests. 
Successive Petitions, Abuse of the Writ and Delay 
A colorable showing of factual innocence should be required 
for federal courts to entertain both second and successive 
petitions in capital cases. (Kuhlman v. Wilson, supra, 477 
U.S. at p. 454 (discussing this standard as to successive 
petitions only).) For claims relating to the penalty phase, 
this would require the petitioner to make a colorable 
showing that the sentencing determination is inaccurate, 
that is, that the determination that the balance of 
aggravating and mitigating factors warrants death is 
inaccurate. 
As for the problem of delayed petitions, current law 
requires that the state prove prejudice resulting from the 
delay before the petitioner is required to justify the 
delay. (Rule 9(a), Rules following 28 u.s.c. § 2254.) As 
applied to capital cases, this rule fails to take into 
William R. Burchill 
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account that when a petitioner is under a death sentence, he 
has a strong incentive to delay. Every procedural stage he 
exhausts brings just that much closer the day of judgment if 
he should not prevail. Thus, capital cases present "the 
only part of the criminal appeals process in which the 
state, rather than the defendant, is the moving force." 
(Note, The Rush to Execution: Successive Habeas Corpus 
Petitions in Capital Cases, 95 Yale L. J. 371, 377 (1985).) 
Hence, in capital cases, the initial burden should be on the 
petitioner to justify his delay. If he cannot do so, the 
petition should be dismissed. If he can, then the burden 
should shift to the state to prove prejudice. The nature of 
the prejudice to the state should be balanced against the 
nature of the petitioner's justification in order to 
determine whether the federal court should hear the claim. 
Additionally, the prejudice component of this analysis 
should be augmented to permit the state to show that because 
of the delay, it will be unable to retry the petitioner. 
(Vasquez v. Hillary (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 283 (Powell, J., 
dissenting).) 
When the petitioner delays his petition until the eve of 
execution, he should be required to bear an especially heavy 
burden of justification. A petition filed within ten days 
of an execution should be presumed to be an abuse of the 
writ. That presumption should be considered rebutted only 
by a showing of extraordinary circumstances. If the delay 
is unjustified, sanctions should be imposed on counsel. 
(See Bell v. Lynaugh (5th Cir. 1988) 858 F.2d 978, 983.) 
A statute of limitations for federal habeas petitions is 
advisable, perhaps one year after decision by the last state 
court to review the matter. 
VI. Certificates of Probable Cause, Stays of Execution, 
Last-Minute Chaos 
Both federal district courts and courts of appeal should 
adopt time limits within which capital cases must be 
decided. They should also adopt time tables for handling 
certificates of probable cause to appeal and stay requests. 
Examples of abusive, last-minute stay applications abound. 
For instance, in Franklin v. Lynaugh (5th Cir. 1988) 860 
F.2d 165, the execution date of November 3 was set in 
September. However, counsel did not file for habeas corpus 
relief in the state court until only ten days before the 
execution date. He then did not file for habeas corpus 
relief in federal court until only sixty hours remained 
before execution. Noting that no justification for these 
delays had been offered, the court concluded that "they 
represent a fixed resolve to call haste and confusion into 
\,, 
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service in Franklin's cause along with analysis and 
argument." (Id. at p. 166.) As Justice Powell stated in 
Woodward v. Hutchins (1~84) 464 U.S. 377, 380, concurring in 
an order vacating a stay of execution: "A pattern seems to 
be developing in capital cases of multiple review in which 
claims that could have been presented years ago are brought 
forward--often in a piecemeal fashion--only after the 
execution date is set or becomes imminent. Federal courts 
should not continue to tolerate--even in capital cases--this 
type of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus." Only by 
setting strictly enforced time limits within which stay 
requests and petitions can be filed can this type of abuse 
be stopped . 
The courts of appeals should give priority to deciding 
capital cases. The guidelines set forth in Barefoot v. 
Estelle, supra, 463 U.S. at 892-896 for expedited 
consideration of the merits of an appeal with the stay 
application should be implemented by all courts of appeal. 
The courts should continue to require a certificate of 
probable cause to appeal, and should not grant a stay unless 
such a certificate is issued. For second or successive 
petitions, a stay should be granted only if there are 
substantial grounds on which relief may be granted. 
Very truly yours, 
JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP 
Attorney General 
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JUN 1 B 1989 
MEMORANDUM TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
SUBJECT: Receipt of Written Comments 
As agreed at our April 21 meeting, Justice Powell on April 26 wrote to a wide 
range of relevant organizations extending an invitation to submit written comments to 
the Ad Hoc Committee. These submissions were to be addressed simultaneously to 
Professor Pearson and me and were to be mailed not later than June 1. 
I am now transmitting for your review the seven sets of comments received by 
this office to date. As explained below, in some instances I have omitted attachments 
and exhibits in the interest of conserving the amount of material to be photocopied and 
keeping this package of more manageable size. If you wish to have any of these 
referenced attachments, of course, please telephone my office and they will be 
dispatched to you immediately. Comments have been received from: 
1. The National Governors' Association. 
2. The Florida Public Def ender Association. 
3. The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. 
4. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
These comments refer to a recent en bane decision by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Coleman v. 
McCormick (No. 85-4242, decided May 5, 1989). This opinion 
is 62 pages long, and therefore I have omitted it in the 
interest of economy. 
FIFTY YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
1939-1989 
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5. The American Civil Liberties Union. Omitted from this 
transmittal is the accompanying statement of Professor 
Yackle before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1985 
opposing the bill, S. 238, 99th Congress. 
6. The American Bar Association. Their submission also 
includes a lengthy amicus curiae brief before the Supreme 
Court this term in Murray v. Giarratano (No. 88-411), and a 
205-page issues and background paper by Professor Ira 
Robbins, reporter for the ABA Task Force. As indicated, 
these documents are not being sent herewith but are available 
from this office. Included is Professor Robbins' Summary of 
Issues for Task Force Consideration. 
7. The National Legal Aid and Def ender Association. Also 
included herewith is a copy of this organization's Standards 
for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases. 
Additional comments may yet be received. For example, we have been notified 
that the headquarters office of the National Association of Attorneys General was 
delayed in transmitting Justice Powell's invitation letter to the individual state offices of 
the attorney general We are told that at least several of the state attorneys general 
wish to submit comments, and Justice Powell has agreed to keep the record open for 





\:- UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT 
----
June 16, 1989 ------
The Honorable Lewis P. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
The Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Chief Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals 
The Honnorable William Terrell Hodges 
Chief Judge, United States 
District Court 
The Honorable Barefoot Sanders 
United States District Court 
Mr. William R. Burchill, Jr. 
General Counsel 
Mr. Albert M. Pearson 
Gentlemen: 
11011 391 •0111 
I would offer as a substitute proposal the four statutes 
attached. My main purpose in offering this substitute is to 
confine the expedition of litigation about death penalty rights 
to federal procedures (with the sole exception of enc uraging the 
appointment of counsel in state habeas) • The irst proposal 
commands federal courts to ~ ex_pedi tiously. er iminal 
cases, bee e of Speedy Tr !al Act pro6Tems;- would come before 
death penalty matters. Coupled with Teague, this statute should 
curtail or eliminate any lengthy delays in federal review. It 
could be handled by a conference resolution requiring~ ~h 
priority rules. I prefer the mandate of a statute. The econd__=) 
imposes a brief statute of limitations but one which does t 
hazard a pet1t!oner's rignts t o a full, fair review. If a state 
provides counsel for its collateral review and during the 
succeeding 60 days, federal review must be commenced within that 
time. This means it would not be necessary~ ~e a writ of 
execution to provoke federal action. The ~ permits the 
highest criminal court of a state to certify federal questions to 
a court of appeals. The ~@ allows a custodiartor --prl'soner to 
seek a declaratory judgment from a district court. A major 
' 
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purpose of all declaratory relief is to allow one who needs a 
decision to get it when the party entitled to seek relief fails 
to take the necessary steps. This just makes the right explicit 
in the death penalty context. 
I recognize that we have not spoken much of the last two 
statutes. I propose them only to round out the cone th t we 
, ~ s uld ffer a alte..r..natives the ~1federal system can provide to 
1~ ad j ud cate ~ deral ri2_.t~ witfiout~elay. Neither------rs' e s sent i al to our task. If the committee thinks them too far off the beaten 
track, they can be dropped and the first statute can be amended 
to delete the reference to them. 
I did not include anything on exhaustion since the state can 
control delays caused by mtxed petitions by waiver and the 
petitioner can control it by exhausting. The certificate of 
probable cause procedure is not directly implicated, so I omitted 
it. Present statutory and decisional law regarding successive 
petitions is deemed sufficient. Better utilization rather than 




Proposed Statutory Amendments to 
Title 28 U.S.C. 
s 1657(b) - ~ court, justice or judge entertaining an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus or a stay of execution brought by a 
prisoner in state custody subject to a capital sentence, or an 
action under 28 u.s.c. S 1293 or S 2256, shall give such action 
priority over all other civil actions pending or filed, except 
prior actions of the same kind. Any appeal from a final order in 
any proceeding under this subsection shall be determined, as soon 
as practicable, but not later than thirty days from the filing of 
the record on appeal. The preparation and filing of such record 
shall be given priority over all other records by the clerk and 
any court reporter involved. 
(c) 1 • 
[Present subsection (b) becomes 
S 2244 (d) - No justice or circuit or district judge shall be 
required to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
to inquire into the detention of a person pursuant to a capital 
sentence by a state court with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated in the state trial court or on direct appeal or 
collateral review of such proceedings unless the application was 
filed within 60 days of the completion of all available 
collateral review procedures in the courts of the state if the 
,. 
petitioner was represented by counsel during any such collateral 
review procedures and during the succeeding 60-day period. 
S 1293 - The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction to answer 
dispositive questions of law, arising under the Constitution or 
laws of the United States in a capital case conviction or 
sentence, which are certified to such court of appeals by the 
highest criminal court of any state within that circuit. 
S 2256 - The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
actions under Chapter 151 by or against the state custodian of a 
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ME:'AORANDUM TO THE AD tlGC COMMITTEE ON HABEA& CORPUS 
REVIEW OF CJ.i.. :?!TAL SENTENCES 
I havt: Ju2t received, and am transmitting for your revh:w, the 
attached lett<":.::' ,Ji° eornment from the Attorney General of th~ State of 
Montana. If &n? O:urther ,.!omments are received, I shall send them to you 
promptly. 
I was sori:::i, fr, have missed being with you last Friday, bEt I look 
forward to sc'3ing y•)1 i aga.in on July 27. 
/ . ..,.-w ~~ . . i •· ,. urch1f~ :t-¥ 
Attachment 






June 21, 1989 
STATE OF MONT ANA 
William R. Burchill Jr. 
General Counsel 
Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts 
Washington DC 20544 
Albert M. Pearson 
Professor of Law 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens GA 30602 
Justice Building 
Helena, Montana 59620 
Re: Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review in 
Capital Cases 
Gentlemen: 
The notice from the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Review in Capital Cases inviting comments on capital collateral 
review from the National Association of Attorneys General by 
June 1, 1989, was not brought to my attention until June 10, 1989. 
It is my hope these comments will nevertheless be taken into 
account. 
The delay in cases involving appeals from habeas corpus 
petitioners in death penalty cases is a serious concern to the 
citizens of Montana. The Ninth Circuit, in a proposed committee 
note to Rules 35-1 to 35-3 of its Circuit Rules, essentially 
perpetuates the practice of delay in these cases by observing that 
requests for initial en bane hearings are "virtually never 
granted." Two Montana-cases illustrate the intolerable delay 
caused by a two-tier review process: 
Coleman v. McCormick., CA85-4242, docketed in October 
1985, argued to a panel in May 1986, reargued en bane in 
July 1988, decision issued May 5, 1989. 
TELEPHONE: ( 406) 444-2026 
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McKenzie ~ Risley, CA85-4156, docketed in September 
1985, argued to panel in May 1986, reargued en bane in 
August 1987, decision issued March 10, 1988.- (Second 
habeas corpus action now pending in the Ninth Circuit, 
despite district court denial of certificate of probable 
cause to appeal.) 
The State's interest in expediting death penalty cases should be 
recognized and accommodated, as suggested by the United States 
Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). In 
furtherance of this interest,' the Courts of Appeal should screen 
these cases either at the initial filing or at the time of 
consideration of the certificate of probable cause, to determine 
whether an initial~ bane hearing is warranted. 
With regard to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the standards for granting a certificate of probable 
cause to appeal should reflect that the petitioner must make a 
"substantial showing of the denial of a federal right." Barefoot 
v. Estelle, 463 U.S. at 893; Van Pilon v. Reed, 799 F.2d 1332 (9th 
Cir. 1986). A certificate of probable cause to appeal should not 
issue if the claim "is squarely foreclosed by statute, rule or 
authoritative court decision, or is lacking any factual basis in 
the record." Id. at 894. Where the district judge has denied the 
certificate of probable cause and has given viable reasons, his 
determination should be given deference by virtue of his 
familiarity with the case. It has been Montana's experience that 
certificates are automatically granted by the Ninth Circuit, even 
before the opposing party has had sufficient time to file a 
response to the request. 
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